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GOD
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Explicit atheism is a philosophical position according to which belief in God is irrational, and 
thus it should be rejected. In this paper, I revisit, extend, and defend against the most telling 
counter arguments the Kalām Cosmological Argument in order to show that explicit atheism 
must be deemed as a positively irrational position.
The following will give the reader a sense of déjà vu: The traditional arguments for atheism 
have been fairly thoroughly criticized by theologians. But atheists can, if they wish, accept the 
criticisms. They may point out that no rational proof of God’s existence is possible, and thereby 
maintain that the rational default position is atheism. I think, however, that a more telling criti-
cism can be made by way of the Kalām Cosmological Argument. Here it can be shown not that 
explicit atheism lacks rational support, but that it is positively irrational, so that atheists can 
maintain their position by an extreme rejection of rational evidence for the existence of God. 
They must now be prepared to deny, not merely what can be proven, but what can be disproven. 
Yes, the foregoing mimics the introductory section to J. L. Mackie’s famous 1955 paper ‘Evil 
and Omnipotence.’ (1955: 200) In his paper, Mackie attempts to show that religious belief is 
irrational on the basis of the traditional problem of evil. In what is to follow, I shall not attempt 
to say anything about the problem of evil. Rather, I would like to revisit and extend the Kalām 
Cosmological Argument for the existence of God (henceforth Kalām).1 Kalām is a deceptively 
simple syllogism but in reality, it is a complex, and a sound, argument. Since Kalām is sound, 
this implies that explicit atheism2 is irrational.
THE ARGUMENT AND PRELIMINARY REMARKS
According to Kalām, the universe is not and cannot be eternal. Rather, the universe came into 
existence by something else. The argument can be expressed as a simple syllogism. For this 
reason, some critics lament that Kalām is a swift argument (Taylor 1997). On the contrary, it 
is far from being swift. As I will illustrate, Kalām is supported by compelling philosophical 
argumentation as well as scientific evidence. According to the version of Kalām that I present 
here, everything that begins to exist is brought into existence by something else. Furthermore, 
2   CARLO ALVARO
Kalām concurs with Big Bang cosmology that the universe came into existence a finite time 
ago. And since neither the universe nor any other object can come into existence by nothing, it 
follows necessarily that the universe was brought into existence by something else. My version 
of Kalām can be presented as follows:
1. All things3 that begin to exist came into existence by something else.
2. The universe is something that began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe came into existence by something else.4
Thus presented, Kalām is a modus ponens deductive and valid argument. A good deductive 
argument is a sound argument, one whose premises are true. Thus, it is necessary to show that 
the premises are true. Before taking up this task, a point worth emphasizing is that Kalām is 
not a theistic argument. Rather, it makes the modest conclusion that the universe came into 
existence by something else. Calum Miller regards what I call the modest conclusion as a 
possible difficulty, which he tries to remedy by way of a probabilistic, Bayesian formulation 
(2014: 522). However, once it is shown that the universe is not eternal, but it was brought into 
existence by something else, it will be clear that the most plausible explanation is that what 
brought the universe into existence is an agent possessing certain characteristics, two of which 
are eternal existence and rationality, which are characteristically attributed to God. My aim here 
is not to argue for theism, though I agree with Miller that such a project can be accomplished 
by employing auxiliary arguments. In my view, Kalām alone leads to deism, which is enough 
to show that explicit atheism is irrational. Having made some preliminary remarks, let us now 
discuss Kalām premise by premise:
Exposition of the premises
Premise 1. All things that begin to exist came into existence by something else
Beginning to exist means that a thing is not eternal. A thing T can begin to exist by something 
else with or without pre- existing material. For example, an idea of a green Martian eating apple 
pie is not made of material stuff. Or a house can begin to exist from material that already exists, 
cement, bricks, and so on. At one time, the idea of the Martian and the house did not exist; at 
a later time, they came into existence. A thing also can begin to exist gradually, as a zygote 
that develops into a fetus and then becomes a baby. The point is that, whether it be out of pre- 
existing material, or whether by a long or a short process or by any other way, certain things 
begin to exist at a certain time, prior to which they did not exist.
It is an undisputed and undisputable fact that contingent things were brought into being by 
something else. Anyone who wishes to deny the truth of this premise must do more than just 
assert that, perhaps, without our knowing, somewhere in the universe some things might come 
into being by nothing. In order to refute the truth of premise 1, one must show that at least some 
things that begin to exist were not brought into being by something else— a very difficult, if not 
impossible, task.
Objects do not spontaneously materialize out of nothing without the existence of something 
else. Moreover, objects do not come into existence out of non- being. It seems more plausible 
that a thing that comes into being, a thing that is not eternal, requires something else that brings 
it into being than the notion that something could come into being out of absolutely nothing. 
Nothing means non- being, not anything, no space, no energy, no time; consequently, being 
cannot just materialize into existence from non- being. Notice that by using the term non- being 
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it is not meant a mysterious entity, such as a quantum vacuum or something of that nature (See 
for example Lawrence Krauss’ A Universe From Nothing 2012, where the term ‘nothing’ refers 
to the quantum vacuum). I simply mean to refer to the negation of existence. Nothing has no 
properties, no causal power, no ontological status— it is not anything. Therefore, I take ex nihilo 
nihil fit as a fundamentally true metaphysical principle.
TWO POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
Objection 1: Since Kalām argues that an analysis of the conclusion leads to the existence of 
God, (I) Who or what brought God into existence? (Arnheim 2015: 18) And (II) Having con-
ceded that ex nihilo nihil fit, out of what does God bring the universe into existence? Regarding 
(I), to my knowledge, no proponent of Kalām argues that everything that exists was brought into 
existence by something else. Rather, the first premise states that only those things that begin 
to exist were brought into existence by something else. Since Kalām argues that the universe 
came into existence a finite time ago, it must follow that God was not brought into existence by 
something else, but He always has existed. (Pruss 2018: 181- 2; Pruss 2012).
To see why this is valid, consider the following: either God is brought into existence by 
something else, say, God1, or He is eternal (which means that nothing brought Him into exis-
tence). If God1 brought God into existence, then what brought God1 into existence? At this 
point, either the explanation ends here, or it is off to an infinite regress. An infinite regress has 
two problems, which I will explain in more detail later as they apply to the supporting argu-
ments of premise 2: (1) An infinite number of things does not exist and cannot be attained by 
successive addition. (2) If the number of things prior to the universe were actually infinite, then 
it would be impossible for the present time to arrive. By saying actually infinite here I mean a 
collection that has a definite and discrete number of members; a proper part of such a collection 
would have the same number of members as the whole collection.
Therefore, assuming the possibility of there being an actually infinite number of Gods, each 
of which brings into existence something else, then the universe would never have been brought 
into existence. First, if the number of Gods were actually infinite, there would be no God0 who 
began the chain of creation. Consequently, there would be no place where creation started in 
the first place. Second, again assuming that the number of Gods were actually infinite, each of 
whom created the next God such that God0 brought into existence God1 who brought into exis-
tence God2 and so on from infinity; then prior to the Godn who brought the universe into exis-
tence, there would be an actually infinite number of Gods. But how long will it take for Godn 
to come into existence? The answer is that, if there were an actually infinite number of Gods 
prior to Godn, then Godn would never have come into existence, and thus the universe would not 
exist. This is the same paradox that we will encounter later when I defend the second premise. 
Therefore, the answer to the question ‘Who or what creates the creator of the universe?’ can be 
simply answered as follows: whatever brought the universe into existence must not itself have 
been brought into existence by something else; rather, whatever brought the universe into exis-
tence must be a necessary being that always has existed.
Regarding (II), The point is that everything that begins to exist must have at least an efficient 
cause, namely, something that brings something else into being. According to Kalām, the uni-
verse came into existence from nothing but not by nothing. It came into existence by an efficient 
cause, God. Proponents of Kalām never argued that everything that begins to exist requires a 
material cause, i.e., the material stuff out of which something is made. Kalām simply argues 
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that everything that comes into existence must be brought into existence by something else, 
whether from pre- existing material or not.
Objection 2: Some philosophers suggest that, while the universe could have come into 
existence from nothing and by nothing, this does not apply to the contents of the universe. 
Graham Oppy, for example, states, ‘there seems to be good reasons to believe that our universe 
is governed by certain conservation laws which ensure that such things do not actually happen.’ 
(1991: 196) However, to be ‘governed’ by laws ensuring that things do not pop into existence 
uncaused is an inadequate explanation for at least two reasons:
(i)  Natural laws are general descriptions of natural events and do not explain why 
only the universe would be allowed to come into existence out of nothing but not 
tables, babies, pizzas, and more. In this case, the critic of Kalām would commit 
the special pleading fallacy. Exactly what principle allows or prevents things from 
coming into existence? After all, since nothing is the absence of existence, it fol-
lows that there is nothing there that does the allowing or preventing. Also, it is 
odd that Oppy, or anyone else, would maintain that the universe is governed by 
certain laws so specific as to prevent things to come into existence out of nothing. 
The notion of such precise laws bespeaks the existence of an intelligent order, 
which is exactly what Kalām tries to establish. Since Oppy, as other atheists do, 
denies the existence of a deity or a creator, and thus concedes that the universe 
is either the product of an a- personal, mechanical event, or that the universe is 
eternal, how could a mechanistic process possibly establish such laws preventing 
chairs and pizza to pop into existence uncaused? The question still remains, Why 
a universe from nothing but not a table from nothing or why an eternal universe? 
Moreover, there would be no explanation for the existence of very specific laws if 
the universe were brought into existence by a mechanistic process or the universe 
were eternal.
(ii)  Modern physics deals with some strange, non- intuitive notions. For example, objects 
increase in mass as they increase speed, electrons can behave like particles or waves or 
both, and, moreover, empty space is not exactly empty. However, here we are not talking 
about coming into existence out of nothing. In quantum field theory, the so- called quan-
tum vacuum is quite rich a state. Consequently, even subatomic particles seem to require 
something else in the background in order to come into being.
Objection 3: William Rowe (2003: 73) observes that if every beginning has a cause, then the 
beginning of an agent’s causing his lifting his arm has a cause as well. But if that event has a 
cause, then it would seem that we must posit a further event— the causing of the agent’s causing 
his arm to lift— and this event too would require a cause, ad infinitum. The conclusion would 
seem that it is not required that every beginning has a cause. First, note that the notion of causal-
ity does not figure in my version of the argument. Perhaps one may reply that phrasing premise 
1 in terms of ‘bringing something into existence’ is a covert way of saying ‘something causes 
something else.’ The notion of causality is quite complicated, and thus I find that expressing the 
premises in terms of ‘bringing into existence by something else’ helps to clarify some confusion 
and avoid unnecessary difficulties (Romero and Pérez 2012). At any rate, even if expressed in 
terms of causality, premise 1 does not assert that every event must have a cause; rather, every-
thing that begins to exist requires a cause. In other words, Rowe’s objection fails because, if it is 
said that an agent’s lifting his arm is something that began to exist, according to premise 1, the 
moving of that agent’s arm was brought into existence by something else— namely, the agent. 
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Everything that begins to exist, ideas, trucks, babies, and so on, comes into existence by some-
thing else, minds, factories, and parents. The truth of this premise, therefore, is so plausibly true 
that it should be accepted absent defeaters.
PREMISE 2. THE UNIVERSE BEGAN TO EXIST
The truth of premise 2 is supported by two arguments, and it is further corroborated by scientific 
evidence. The first argument shows that an actually infinite number of things cannot exist. The 
second argument shows that it is impossible to attain a collection that has an actually infinite 
number of members by adding one member after another.
FIRST ARGUMENT: AN ACTUAL INFINITE CANNOT EXIST
There seem to be only two options: either the universe began to exist a finite time ago, or the 
universe is beginningless. Kalām argues that the former is true and the latter impossible. Let 
me illustrate why the universe must have a beginning. From the present time, the number of 
temporal events in the future will increase as time goes on. However, from the present time, the 
past temporal events are not increasing because the past has already happened. Thus, if the uni-
verse were beginningless, this would entail that the number of temporal events of the universe 
(let’s say years) would be actually infinite. Since events in the past have already occurred, the 
number of past years is not increasing farther in the past as we speak. Consequently, the claim 
that the universe is beginningless implies that the number of years in the past is a number that 
is not increasing and yet it is infinite. In other words, the number of years in the past would 
form a complete set whose number of members is discrete and not growing as we speak and yet 
infinite, which is impossible.
To start, consider that it would seem possible to add one or more temporal events to the 
universe without altering the total number of years or even without altering the present. But 
by adding one or more years, surely the number of years must increase, and the present would 
be affected by such a procedure. However, assuming that the universe has an actually infinite 
number of years, by adding one more year, the universe would still have the same number of 
years that it had prior to adding one more year— namely, the number of years would be an actu-
ally infinite before and an actually infinite after the addition. Suppose now that it was added 
an actually infinite number of years to our universe. In such a case the result would not change 
either— an actually infinite number of years before and an actually infinite number of years 
after the addition. Moreover, it would be possible to add an actually infinite number of years by 
pushing them into the past without altering the present.5
Equally puzzling, it would be possible to remove years without ever running out of them or 
altering the present. Consider the following: keep the even- numbered years 2020, 2018, 2016…
and remove the odd- numbered years, 2021, 2019, 2017, 2015…and so on. Paradoxically, after 
having removed all the odd- numbered years— an actually infinite number of them— the uni-
verse would still have left an actually infinite number of years, the even- numbered ones. Note, 
however, that we have subtracted the same number of years from the same number of years, an 
actually infinite number minus an actually infinite number, which would give us as a result an 
actually infinite number of years. And such an operation could be performed again and again. 
How many times? It could be performed an actually infinite number of times without changing 
the final result. By removing every other year each time, the universe will never run out of 
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years. Now remove all the years prior to the year 2021 (Note that ex hypothesi, the years prior 
to the year 2021 are an actually infinite number of years.) In such a case, the only year left 
would be the year 2021. Again, an actually infinite number of years has been subtracted from 
an actually infinite number of years, but this time the result is only one year.
And if all the years prior to 2020 were to be removed, two years would be left, 2020 and 
2021. But again, an actually infinite number of years would be subtracted from an actually 
infinite number of years, and yet what is left are two years. Such operations of adding and 
subtracting members of an actually infinite set can yield any number from zero to infinity. The 
point of this thought experiment is meant to show the absurdities of a universe or any other 
collection that allegedly has an actually infinite number of members, in the case of the universe 
a number of temporal sequences. Such absurdities, therefore, show that no collection whose 
number of members is actually infinite can exist. For if such collections could exist, the absur-
dities just described would be possible. By the same token, the universe must be a collection 
composed of a finite number of years.
SOME OBVIOUS OBJECTIONS
Some may protest that subtraction and division are simply not defined in such cases and thus 
not permitted in transfinite arithmetic (See for example Morriston 2002: 150). It is not possible, 
for instance, to calculate ‘? + ?’ or ‘n – n’ unless and until the terms are well defined. Since such 
calculations are undefined, they do not demonstrate anything. In short, in transfinite arithmetic 
subtraction and division are not prohibited, but rather undefined operations. The problem with 
this objection is that it might well be that in transfinite arithmetic subtracting infinities from 
infinities is not permitted because the terms are not clearly defined (not to mention the fact that 
there are different types of infinites— some larger than others). However, in real life I am free to 
add and subtract whatever I wish. If I owned an actually infinite number of coins, for example, 
no mathematics or numismatic police could (or ought to) prohibit my adding to, or subtracting 
from, my collection any number of coins as I please. Consequently, the objection does not 
undermine the conclusion that an actually infinite number of things cannot exist because it leads 
to absurdities. If a collection of things that has an actually infinite number of items cannot exist, 
by the same token the series of past years of the universe cannot be actually infinite. It follows 
that the number of past events in the universe is finite. Therefore, the universe began to exist.
Another objection is advanced by Graham Oppy who agrees with J. L. Mackie (1982) that 
‘Cantorian set theory shows that it is possible for there to be worlds in which there are infini-
ties…Cantorian set theory reveals that worlds with actual infinites are logically possible, there 
can be no good a priori argument against actual infinite temporal sequences.’ (1991: 194- 15) 
This objection is misguided. It is one thing to say that there is a logical possibility, but it is 
quite another thing to assert that a certain logical possibility can be instantiated. The objection 
loses its force when it is considered the distinction that Plantinga (1974, 1986) makes between 
what is strictly logically possible and what is broadly logically possible. Thus, the logical con-
sistency of infinite set theory does not warrant or sanction that infinite sets can be instantiated. 
Even if conceptually possible, it does not follow from Cantorian set theory, or from any other 
place for that matter, that the existence of an actually infinite number of things is metaphysi-
cally possible.
Some might be still unconvinced by the first argument and maintain that at least some 
infinites can be instantiated, and the universe might well be one of them. For this reason, the 
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second argument provides synergistic support to the first argument by showing the impossibil-
ity of forming or traversing infinites:
Second Argument: An actual infinite cannot be attained by successive addition
This second argument has two strands: (1) it is impossible to attain a collection of items, such as 
coins, stamps, books, or years, that has an actually infinite number of members by adding one 
item after another; and (2) it is impossible to count all or traverse all members of an actually 
infinite number of things. Applying such considerations to the universe, it would be impossible 
to count all or traverse all the temporal events of the universe if the universe had an actually 
infinite number of temporal sequences. It would be impossible to move along the timeline from 
an allegedly infinite past to any moment on the timeline.
Beginning with (1): It is impossible to attain a collection whose number of members is actu-
ally infinite. This point is quite obvious: it is impossible to complete a collection of physical 
things, any collection, and attain an actually infinite number of items by adding one item after 
another. Consider a philatelist who wishes to own an actually infinite number of stamps. This 
would be a hopeless goal. In order to possess an actually infinite number of stamps our phi-
latelist would have to attain a collection whose number of items is complete and yet actually 
infinite. But this is clearly impossible because our philatelist could potentially add new stamps 
to her collection. It would be impossible to complete her collection by adding stamps until the 
last stamp that completes the collection is added.
Suppose that our collector is immortal. First, it does not seem possible that any postal service 
could mint an actually infinite number of stamps. How long would they take to complete such 
a task? Second, since our philatelist can always add one more stamp to her collection, it would 
be impossible to attain a complete series because any number + 1 always adds up to a finite 
number. Such a collection, given time, could reach an unfathomably large number of stamps, 
but it will never become a collection whose number of stamps is actually infinite. The implica-
tion for the universe is evident. It is impossible that the universe became a collection containing 
an actually infinite number of temporal sequences by successive addition of temporal events. 
It does not matter how much time one has and how many stamps or temporal sequences can 
be produced and acquired. The point is that for any number of stamps or temporal sequences, 
it will always be possible to add one more. Consequently, the universe must be a collection 
consisting of a finite number of past temporal events. Therefore, the universe began to exist.
(2) It is impossible to count all members or traverse an actually infinite number of things.
Consider the following thought experiment: if a collection had an actually infinite number of 
things, it would be impossible to count them all. Suppose that the things in question were the 
steps in an infinite staircase; it would be impossible to walk over all the steps. Note, again, that 
it is not the amount of time available that matters. Imagine that one is immortal, and that time 
never ends. Still, it would not be possible to enumerate or walk on all the steps. This obviously 
applies to the universe. If the universe were composed of an actually infinite number of tempo-
ral events, it would be impossible to count or traverse all the events. Now one may say that it 
is not important whether one can count the temporal events in the universe. What’s important 
is whether it is possible to traverse an actually infinite number of temporal events. But this 
argument shows exactly that such a task of traversing an actually infinite number of temporal 
sequences is impossible.
To illustrate this point, consider what I call the Stairway Paradox. Consider our infinite stair-
way. Suppose that there is a stairway that ends here. I can see where it ends, but since it is very 
long, I cannot see where it begins. We are told that it has no beginning; but rather it stretches 
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way down (or up or any other direction one prefers) to infinity— there is no first step. It has an 
actually infinite number of steps. Suppose further that a man standing on the last step claimed 
to have just walked down the stairs from infinity. How could this be possible? Where and when 
did he start walking down the stairs? Certainly not from the beginning since there isn’t any. 
Since there is no beginning, no first step, he could never have started. Moreover, if there are 
an actually infinite number of steps, how could he have walked down from infinity to the end 
of the stairs? It seems clear that the man is not telling the truth. It is not possible to traverse 
a stairway that has no beginning. It does not matter how much time the man had to complete 
the task, because if the stairway has an actually infinite number of steps, no amount of time 
would suffice to complete such a task. If such a stairway really existed, it would be impossible 
to traverse it one way or the other. If we challenged the man who claims to have walked down 
the stairs from infinity and retrace his steps backwards, we will always be walking forever and 
never walk all the way down to the end of the stairway. Why, because the number of steps is 
actually infinite.
Applied to the universe, it may be recalled that according to the second premise of Kalām, the 
universe began to exist. In other words, the universe has a finite number of temporal sequences. 
This is confirmed by the fact that the present time exists. Just as it applies to the stairway 
example, if a man managed to walk down to the last step of such a stairway it means that he 
started walking somewhere. Regarding the universe, since the present exists, it follows that the 
universe began a finite time ago. To say that the universe never began to exist, that it is eternal, 
implies that the number of events in the history of the universe is actually infinite like the begin-
ningless stairway. But if that were the case, it would be impossible for the present time to have 
arrived. Considering that there is no starting point, the present would never arrive.
Let us consider an objection. Oppy concedes that a collection that has no starting point, like 
my endless stairway, cannot be traversed. However, he argues, ‘there are infinite collections of 
different orders: consider, for instance, the collection which we might represent by 1, 2, 3,…3, 
2, 1. Consequently, it seems that there are infinites which can be traversed.’ (1991: 194) But if 
the ellipsis between the first and second 3 represents an actually infinite number of numbers, 
how could it ever be possible to traverse it? After counting 1, 2, 3, one would have to count to 
the end of numbers and then backwards down to 3, 2, 1. But do numbers end? This is not a hard 
task to complete, but rather an impossible one. Since numbers do not end, one would have to 
count forever and never exhaust natural numbers— and therefore one will never be able to count 
up to the second set of numbers. In other words, even such an infinite as that suggested by Oppy 
would be impossible to traverse. Or, if it is possible to traverse, it follows that the numerical 
series represented by the ellipsis does not, after all, contain an actually infinite number of items, 
but a finite one.
BIG BANG COSMOLOGY AND THE BEGINNING
The preceding discussion provides compelling reasons to demonstrate that the universe cannot 
be an actual infinite; nor can it have become an actual infinite by adding one temporal sequence 
after another; moreover, it must be a collection that has a finite number of temporal sequences. 
Consequently, the universe began to exist. Therefore, we have good reasons to believe that 
premise 2 is true. While these arguments should suffice, I would like to offer one more, which 
is Big Bang cosmology.
The discovery that the universe is in a state of isotropic expansion, along with other data, 
has revealed to science that at a finite time in the past the universe was in a small and infinitely 
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dense state, prior to which there was nothing. Such observations became known as the standard 
Big Bang model. Fascinatingly, although science and theology have been in disagreement on 
the question of God’s existence, and the role of God in the creation of the universe, it is the very 
Big Bang theory that makes God’s existence practically undeniable. Big Bang cosmology is yet 
another way of confirming the truth of premise 2. The Big Bang is a very contentious subject. 
A number of scientists and philosophers deny that the Big Bang implies that the universe came 
into existence from nothing. However, contemporary scientific understanding regards the uni-
verse as a finite entity that began to exist at a finite time in the past.
There are at least three dissenting groups that try to undermine the significance of the Big 
Bang for the validity of Kalām. First, there are those who deny that the Big Bang singularity 
helps Kalām (for example, Pitts 2008 passim). However, while I believe that the Big Bang 
theory provides further support to Kalām, the Big Bang singularity is not required for the suc-
cess of Kalām. The philosophical arguments that I discussed earlier alone provide compelling 
support to the temporal finitude of the universe irrespective of the Big Bang theory. The Big 
Bang theory is a sort of (philosophical) cherry on top of the cake. Second, there are those who 
accept the Big Bang theory, but deny that God is behind it. However, if it was not God, it is 
hard to believe that the Big Bang is an accident or something of that nature. I will discuss this 
contention in the next section.
Third, there are those who argue that the Big Bang theory could be wrong. To this last con-
tention, I would like to say that, to my knowledge, no other model of the universe has survived 
careful scrutiny like the Big Bang. Granted, there still is a great deal that we do not know. 
However, we must take note of the fact that logical argumentation supporting the premise that 
the universe began to exist is further confirmed by science. Hugh Ross (2001: 102) points out 
that even Hawking admits that, given the validity of the general theory of relativity, time has 
a beginning (1988. 140- 141). As Aquinas observed, once it is proven that the world began to 
exist, there will be no doubt that a first cause exists. (Aquinas 1.13.30) I want to suggest that 
it is not an accident that the Big Bang theory has stood for as long as it has. As Ross observes,
Today it can be said that no theory of physics has ever been tested in so many different con-
texts and so rigorously as general relativity. The fact that general relativity has withstood all 
these tests so remarkably well implies that no basis at all remains for doubting the conclusion 
of the space- time theorem. (Ross 2001: 107)
Although we still have a lot to learn about the universe, such a lacuna does not affect our cer-
tainty of cosmic inflation. This epoch is 10−36 seconds after the Big Bang singularity, to some-
time between 10−33 and 10−32 seconds after the singularity. What happened before that epoch 
is hard to tell. But it is a widely accepted theory about what happened during the first fraction 
of a second during the Big Bang. However, it is not a disputed fact that our current universe 
had a starting point. As the Borde– Guth– Vilenkin theorem shows, any universe that has been 
expanding cannot be infinite in the past, but must have a past space- time beginning (Borde, 
Guth, Vilenkin 2003). As Barrow and Tipler have remarked, space and time were created at the 
singularity, which implies that the universe was brought into being from nothing. (1986: 442) 
Space, time, and matter did not exist prior to the Big Bang. Prior to the universe’s coming into 
existence, no space, no time, no matter existed. Thus, it necessarily follows that the universe 
was brought into existence by something else. Something that never began to exist. Something 
eternal, spaceless, immaterial, and extremely powerful.
A number of alternative models have been presented to the scientific community without 
much success. George Ellis (2004) for example has suggested the possibility that our universe 
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is eternal in the sense that space closes upon itself like a sphere, and thus could have existed 
forever in a static state and then go into inflationary expansion. Ellis, however, did not claim 
that his model was realistic. In fact, a static universe is unstable with respect to quantum col-
lapse. (2004). Another model that might show that the universe is eternal in the past is a cyclical 
model. Namely, the universe could have undergone an infinite cycle of expansions and contrac-
tions. This model, however, was abandoned due to its conflict with the second law of thermo-
dynamics, which requires that entropy should increase in each cycle of cosmic evolution. If our 
universe had already been through an infinite number of cycles, it would have already reached 
a state of maximum entropy. But this is contrary to our observation of our state. Paul Steinhardt 
and Neil Turok recently revisited such an idea of a cyclic universe (2002). They suggested that 
in each cycle, the universe’s expansion is greater than contraction, so that the volume of the 
universe is increased. However, the total entropy of the universe would have increased even in 
such a case because the volume of the universe is now greater than it was in its earlier cycles. 
Consequently, even a cyclic universe cannot be past eternal.
CONSIDERING SOME OBJECTIONS
In a recent paper, Brian J. Pitts remarks that Kalām does not succeed in showing that the uni-
verse is finite and assumes ‘that an infinite past is metaphysically possible.’ Also, an interesting 
assertion he makes is that ‘[i]t is also difficult to regard as omnipotent a God who could not 
create Hilbert’s hotel.’ (2008: 683) Hilbert’s Hotel is a paradox that the German mathematician 
David Hilbert specifically devised in order to challenge our ideas of actual infinity. The paradox 
is a reductio ad absurdum type of argument that supposed the existence of a hotel that has an 
actually infinite number of rooms. By considering the possibility of such a hotel and illustrat-
ing the absurdities that would ensue as a result, Hilbert shows that no collection containing an 
actually infinite number of members can be instantiated. Note that the Hilbert’s Hotel Paradox 
is supposed to achieve what I discussed in my first argument in support of the second premise 
of Kalām. For example, any normal hotel with a finite number of rooms that has no vacancy 
would not be able to accommodate new guests.
However, if the hotel described by Hilbert really existed, even if it had no vacancy, it could 
accommodate any number of new guests— even an actually infinite number of guests by mak-
ing each guest shift along one room. The guest in room one moves to room two, and so on, 
thereby making the first room available. And by moving all the current guests into all odd- 
numbered rooms, and freeing up all even- numbered rooms, the hotel could accommodate an 
actually infinite number of guests. Moreover, it would seem possible to repeat this process of 
adding an actually infinite number of guests forever. It is clear that such a hotel cannot exist. 
Using Hilbert’s Hotel as an analogue for the universe, if a hotel that has an actually infinite 
number of rooms cannot exist, by the same token, the universe cannot have an actually infinite 
number of temporal sequences.
To respond to Pitt’s observation that a God that cannot instantiate Hilbert’s Hotel is not 
omnipotent, I would like to make two points. The first is that Pitts commits the textbook 
example of the straw man fallacy. For he simply misunderstands the notion of omnipotence. 
Omnipotence, according to theism, is not the property by virtue of which God can instantiate 
or do just anything and everything He wants. By saying that God is omnipotent, it is not meant 
that God can round the square or create a married bachelor. Rounding the square or creating a 
bachelor who is married are utterances without reference, which are practically absurd. Thus, 
God cannot instantiate what is absurd and illogical— no one could. Better yet, it is incorrect to 
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put it in terms of something that God cannot do because God’s own nature represents what can 
and cannot be done. The fallacy, therefore, is that omnipotence is not that property by virtue 
of which God brings about what it is impossible for God to bring about. For example, God is 
regarded by many theists as a necessary being that cannot fail to exist. Thus, it would be impos-
sible (absurd) for God to just make himself go out of existence. Or it would be impossible for 
God to create a necessary being. But this in no way implies lack of omnipotence.
Also, Kalām is not a theistic argument, nor is it an argument for God’s omnipotence. Note 
that the conclusion of Kalām is not, ‘Therefore, God exists.’ Rather, it is, ‘Therefore, the uni-
verse was brought into existence by something else.’ Furthermore, even if it is conceded that 
God is not omnipotent because He cannot create Hilbert’s Hotel, such a concession would not 
undermine Kalām. In fact, it would work in favor of Kalām. That is, God can bring the universe 
into existence, but not even God is capable of creating actual infinites. Since God is not capable 
of such a feat, no actual infinites can exist. Therefore, the universe is a finite collection of tem-
poral sequences. Thus, Kalām works regardless of whether God is capable of creating infinites.
Also, according to Pitts (and other authors), an infinite past is possible.6 The reason he gives 
has to do with an alleged confusion regarding size and cardinality. He writes, ‘Indeed, con-
temporary physics implicitly denies that cardinality exhausts the notion of sameness of size or 
counting for infinite sets: physicists routinely count the number of degrees of freedom in a field 
theory…’ (2008: 683) According to Pitts, physicists are quite comfortable with the notion of 
infinity. Indeed, without such a notion, Pitts continues, field theory and constrained dynamics 
would be nonsense. (683) But this just begs the question. I cannot imagine how any physicist 
could count degrees of freedom and determine that they are actually infinite. Moreover, as 
Feferman aptly observes, “infinitary concepts are not essential to the mathematization of sci-
ence.” (1998: 19). Furthermore, as already mentioned, the mathematical concepts of infinity do 
not imply that infinity in instantiable in the real world.
Such observations seem to make the same mistake of Zeno’s argument for the impossibility 
of motion. That is, Zeno’s paradox is supposed to demonstrate that there are an actually infinite 
number of subpoints between, say, point A and point B. Yet, it is possible to walk from point A 
to point B. Similarly, there is an actually infinite number of temporal events, and yet the present 
is here. But this sort of argument has two flaws: the first is that it simply begs the question. If 
Zeno’s intervals add up to a finite distance, then it would seem that any distance has a finite 
number of physical points. Zeno seems to assume the existence of an actually infinite number 
of subpoints between points A and B, which is the very thing that he needs to prove. The second 
issue is that Zeno’s paradox is the wrong analogy for the universe. That is, in Zeno’s paradox 
the subpoints between a finite distance, between A and B, are potentially infinite. Such points, 
however, add up to a finite distance. By contrast, in the case of an infinite past, the temporal 
sequences that compose the universe are supposed to be actually infinite adding up to an infinite 
distance.
Thus, mathematically speaking, we can subdivide a distance into a potentially infinite num-
ber of points. However, in the physical world, it is obvious that I can walk between points A 
and B. Suppose, for example that between the years 2001 and 2021 there are an actually infinite 
number of temporal series. This seems to imply that from 2001, I cannot ever arrive at 2021 and 
that 2021 will never exist. But here we are in 2021. (For a similar example, see Benardete 1964: 
236- 7) Conversely, if the universe is a collection of an actually infinite number of temporal 
sequences, there is a point B, which is the present. But there is no point A. Therefore, if there is 
no beginning, no point A, it would be impossible to ever arrive to point B.
Consequently, the past temporal sequences that compose the universe cannot extend 
infinitely far into the past, as Hilbert’s Hotel Paradox aptly illustrates. At any rate, while Big 
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Bang cosmology confirms that the universe began to exist, Kalām need not rely on Big Bang 
cosmology. True, if one day cosmologists will find that the universe did not begin to exist a 
finite time ago, then that discovery would constitute ground for questioning Kalām. But it must 
be borne in mind that the red- light shift, inflation, Penrose– Hawking singularity theorems, the 
Borde- Guth- Vilenkin singularity theorem, and the microwave background radiation constitutes 
remarkable evidence that the universe is not eternal in the past.
Pitts also contends that the Big Bang argument used to support theism ultimately fails 
because it is susceptible to infamous God- of- the- gaps syndrome (696). The so- called God- of- 
the- gaps fallacy occurs when gaps in our scientific knowledge about the world are plugged up 
with God. For example, in the past some people regarded earthquakes and hurricanes as divine 
acts of upset gods. Or attributed the cause of various sicknesses to demonic possession. This, 
however, is not the case regarding Big Bang cosmology, because it is the best and most accurate 
scientific theory that we have, which indicates that time and space are finite in the past. And the 
very Kalām is a religious- free logical syllogism. Pitts writes,
Typical worries about ‘God of the Gaps’ apologetic arguments involve the claim that there is 
a long history of appeals to special divine action to explain the phenomena, but later natural 
explanations for such a [sic] phenomena appeared, making the appeal to special divine action 
unnecessary and even foolish (2008: 696).
First, as already remarked Big Bang cosmology cannot be considered as an example God- of- 
the- gaps because it is not a theistic theory, but the most accurate scientific theory and model of 
the universe according to which the universe began to exist. Second, it would be interesting to 
know what sort of natural explanation one expects. Natural phenomena within the universe have 
natural explanations. Of course, there are many aspects of the world we still do not understand. 
However, when it comes to the existence of the universe ex nihilo, what could possibly explain 
it? Since Big Bang cosmology is the best scientific explanation for the origin of the universe, 
and prior to the existence of the universe there was nothing, which natural phenomenon could 
possibly explain the universe coming into existence from nothing and by nothing? It seems to 
me that it is more plausible that the universe came into existence by a rational agent than the 
notion that the universe came from nothing and by nothing, especially if we consider that the 
latter relies on no evidence whatsoever.
CONCLUSION 3: THEREFORE, THE UNIVERSE WAS BROUGHT INTO EXISTENCE BY 
SOMETHING ELSE
The first premise of Kalām is undoubtedly true. Out of nothing, nothing comes. Regarding the 
second premise, I have presented two compelling arguments that agree with scientific evidence. 
Such arguments provide compelling reasons to think that the premises of Kalām are more plau-
sibly true than their negations. We now consider the conclusion: the universe was brought into 
existence by something else.
Atheists are divided on this conclusion: some argue that, while Kalām is deductively valid, it 
may fall short of soundness. As we have seen, however, none of the counter arguments discussed 
in this paper strike as devastating to the premises of the Kalām. Thus, all premises should be 
regarded as true, absent much stronger defeaters, and so the argument is sound. Others accept 
the conclusion but deny that it was God or something like Him that brought the universe into 
being. It could have been something abstract, it may be argued, but not necessarily God. At this 
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juncture, then, we must ask whether there is something more informative that we can say about 
the conclusion, something more specific about the entity that brought the universe into being. 
From the very nature of the conclusion, the entity that brought the universe into being must be 
uncaused. But how is it possible? Is this a case of special pleading? Not so because Kalām does 
not assert that just about everything that exists must be brought into existence by something 
else. Rather, it asserts that only those things that begin to exist are brought into existence by 
something else (See 2018: 182).
Consequently, the entity that brought the universe into being is not one of those things that 
began to exist. From the following analysis, I think we are justified in calling the entity that 
brought the universe into existence God because it possesses those attributes that theists ascribe 
to God. God is an uncaused being. As we have seen, whatever it is that brought the universe into 
existence must be uncaused— it must be eternal. Also, God must be atemporal. This is obvious: 
since time starts with the universe, prior to the beginning of the universe God exists outside 
time. Next, God must be immaterial because matter cannot exist before the creation of matter.
Moreover, the entity in question must be a rational being, a non- material person endowed 
with freedom of the will capable of freely bringing the universe into existence. But why can’t 
the entity that brought the universe into existence be a process or mechanism or an abstract 
entity, one may observe? Why a rational being? To answer such an important question, we must 
consider how a timeless, impersonal entity can give rise to a temporal and spatial effect such as 
the universe. If the entity in question is an impersonal set of sufficient conditions or determin-
istic laws (leaving aside the question of how such conditions or laws can exist eternally prior to 
the universe), then such entities or laws would have to exist without bringing the universe into 
being first. But if such laws or conditions are sufficient to cause the universe, and supposedly 
they are eternal, it necessarily follows that the universe would exist from eternity as well.
In other words, if the sufficient and necessary conditions that brought the universe into exis-
tence were timelessly present, then the universe would be an eternal effect brought into exis-
tence by such conditions or laws. But since the universe, as we have seen, is not eternal, but the 
entity that brought it into existence is, then the entity in question must be personal. The only 
solution to the question of how an atemporal entity can bring into existence a temporal effect 
is if the cause is a personal agent who freely chooses to create an effect in time without any 
prior determining conditions. And thus, the conclusion of Kalām leads us not merely to a tran-
scendent cause of the universe, but also to the extended conclusion that there exists a personal 
creator endowed with freedom of the will who can decide to create the universe.
Let me illustrate why such an entity must be God by way of an analogy. In Ray Bradbury’s 
novel, Fahrenheit 451, firemen are in charge of burning books instead of stopping fires. The 
number in the title, 451, refers to the ignition temperature of paper, 451 degrees Fahrenheit (or 
233 degrees Celsius). Now imagine a chamber that contains only oxygen and sheets of paper. If 
the temperature in the chamber is lower than 451 degrees Fahrenheit, the paper is not burning. 
Suppose that the temperature is 400 degrees Fahrenheit. When I turn up the thermostat to 451 
degrees, as soon as the temperature reaches 451 degrees, the paper burns. The temperature of 
451 degrees Fahrenheit is an inanimate thing and therefore does not itself have the choice or 
the freedom to decide whether and when to make the paper burn. In other words, when the suf-
ficient conditions for burning paper are present, paper must burn. And if the temperature in the 
room had been 451 degrees Fahrenheit from eternity, then the paper would have burned from 
eternity (and would be burned up by now). Following the foregoing analogy, had the eternal 
conditions that brought the universe into existence been mechanistic and sufficient in order to 
bring the universe into existence, the universe would have also been eternal.
14   CARLO ALVARO
To give another example, consider that these letters ‘DDDDDDDD’ are brought into exis-
tence by my exercising pressure upon the D key of my computer keyboard. Suppose that an 
object, say, a stone, has been exercising pressure upon the D key of my computer keyboard 
from eternity (Obviously we have to suppose the existence of an eternal computer, and an 
eternal stone which is an extravagant presupposition, but it just works for the purpose of the 
thought experiment). Let’s assume that such a pressure on the D key brings about only eight 
consecutive D letters. It follows that a pattern of eight D letters, ‘DDDDDDDD’, would have 
existed from eternity. Again, had the condition for eight letters D been eternally present, that is, 
had the stone been exercising pressure on the D key from eternity, then ‘DDDDDDDD’ would 
have been eternally present, as well. Regarding the universe, however, we have concluded that 
something eternal brought the universe into existence; thus, the universe is not eternal. The only 
plausible explanation, therefore, is that the thing that brought the universe into existence must 
be a personal agent who freely chooses to bring the universe into existence without any prior 
determining conditions.
Therefore, the cause of the universe had to have the power and freedom to decide and ini-
tiate a change, that mechanistic or impersonal conditions lack. Since God is endowed with 
free choice of the will, He can initiate this change. God had the complete freedom to bring the 
universe into existence or not. Considering all these reasons, I find the notion that the thing that 
brought the universe into existence is God the most cogent of any other option. Quentin Smith 
suggests that the first state of the universe was a timeless point from which its first temporal 
state emerged (2002: 95). However, in the first place, such an assertion in no way addresses the 
question of how the universe went from a dormant state to a temporal state. It is inexplicable 
how an eternal, timeless state gives rise to a temporal space. One would have to maintain that 
that is just the way things are. Second, as Craig notes,
The ontological status of the Big Bang singularity is a metaphysical question concerning 
which one will be hard- pressed to find a discussion in scientific literature. The singularity 
does not exist in space and time; therefore it is not an event. Typically it is cryptically said to 
lie on the boundary of space- time. But the ontological status of this boundary point is virtually 
never discussed. (Craig 1992: 240)
Nothing in classical or in quantum cosmology even indicates that the singularity is meta-
physically necessary. If the manifold didn’t exist, neither would its boundary points. In sum, 
as far as I can see, there are no really good reasons a timeless entity, if there were one, could 
possibly be connected to a temporal effect; unless the timeless entity in question is endowed 
with freedom of the will, as God is, by virtue of which He can exist without the universe and 
then act in such a way as to bring the universe into existence.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is said that one must follow the evidence where it leads. What should strike one is the degree 
of cogency of the arguments given in support of the premises of Kalām. Such arguments revel 
in the strength of sound philosophical argumentation as well as compelling scientific evidence, 
all of which point in the direction of the beginning of space- time a finite time ago. Conversely, 
while a variety of counter arguments exist (more than what could be discussed in a single 
paper), such arguments do not manage to undercut Kalām. Note, furthermore, that none of the 
authors who advance such counter arguments has ever given a plausible alternative account of 
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the origin of the universe. Despite the variety of discussions, their bottom line is that either the 
universe spontaneously came into existence or that the universe is eternal. What I tried to show 
throughout this paper is that Kalām shows that such conclusions are significantly less plausi-
ble than the notion that God brought the universe into existence a finite time ago. Therefore, 
explicit atheism is an irrational position. An important consideration is that while Kalām leads 
to the conclusion that there must be a creator of the universe, which I call God, I have argued for 
a modest conclusion that leads to deism. Kalām, for example, says nothing about (a) whether 
humans are the crown of God’s creation; and (b) it says nothing about the moral character of 
God (For such a discussion, see Law 2010; Alvaro 2020) or his relationship with us.
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Notes
1 Kalām can be traced back to medieval Islamic scholasticism. One notable proponent was the 11th- century 
Persian Muslim philosopher Al- Ghazali. More recently, William Lane Craig championed the argument in his 
book, Kalām Cosmological Argument (1979).
2 See the various classifications of atheism in Smith, (1979). Atheism: The Case Against God.
3 By ‘things’ it is meant objects, people, animals, ideas, and so on.
4 I prefer to present the argument in a deductive form. However, it can be presented inductively as follows: If 
everything that begins to exist was brought into existence by something else, and the universe is one of those 
things that began to exist, it follows that the universe was brought into existence by something else.
5 This is my rather bizarre version of the Hilbert’s Hotel Paradox.
6 One should be wary of such an assertion considering that there are compelling arguments against the possi-
bility of an infinite past but practically no arguments for it.
